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Depression and Memory: Are 
Impairments Remediable Through 
Attentional Control? 
Paula T. Hertel 
People who are in depressed 
mood states or who are formally di­
agnosed as clinically depressed fre­
quently complain of impaired mem­
ory. Such complaints have been 
substantiated by laboratory re­
search, most of which supports the 
theoretical assumption that atten­
tional resources play a causal role in 
producing the impairments. Specific 
theoretical frameworks do differ, 
however, in the proposed nature of 
this role and in their corresponding 
implications for remediation. The 
most prevalent positions are versions 
of a capacity framework (e.g., cog­
nitive effort or resource allocation). 1 
If you are depressed, according to 
the capacity framework, your atten­
tional resources are either reduced 
neurochemically or allocated perva­
sively to matters of personal con­
cern. 2 Either way, if the task at 
hand requires hard thinking, your 
performance is impaired by the in­
sufficiency of attentional resources. 
Presumably, the lifting of the impair­
ment awaits successful psychophar­
macological treatment or resolution 
of your personal concerns. 
Now consider the viewpoint of 
what I have called the cognitive­
initiative framework. 3 According to 
this framework, your attentional re­
sources are sufficient. What is miss­
ing is the initiative to control them. 
In the absence of explicit instruc­
tions or task constraints, depressed 
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people show less initiative in allo­
cating readily available resources to 
ultimately beneficial procedures. 
The implication from this framework 
is that artificial control can produce 
cognitive competence. 
To show that depressed people 
attend excessively to matters of per­
sonal concern-sometimes to the 
point of exasperation-is not to im­
ply that such perseverations are in­
evitable. Attentional control can be 
achieved through experimentally es­
tablished procedures for focusing at­
tention on the task and for monitor­
ing the relevance of the past. These 
two general categories of means for 
attentional control provide an orga­
nizational structure for my research 
on depression and memory. 
FOCUSING ATIENTION ON 
THE TASK 
The advantages of attentional 
control were most simply demon­
strated in the following experiment, 
performed with clinically depressed 
outpatients and nondepressed con­
trol subjects.4 In the first phase, they 
made decisions about whether target 
words fit sensibly in accompanying 
sentence frames. On some trials, the 
word was the obvious choice for the 
missing element in the frame (e.g., 
dream for the frame "She was awak­
ened by her frightening __ "). On 
other trials, the word was just one of 
several words that might fit the frame 
(e.g., dream for "He was alarmed 
by the frightening __ "). In the 
former case, the words and frames 
could be integrated easily to provide 
elaborations (i.e., meaningful con-
Published by Cambridge University Press 
texts for the target words) that would 
benefit performance in Phase 2, 
when subjects were tested on their 
free recall of the target words. In the 
latter case, such elaborations pre­
sumably would be more difficult, 
but ultimately more distinctive, and 
thereby would establish even greater 
advantages in later recall. Ellis and 
his colleagues5 had used a similar 
procedure to show that college stu­
dents who were experimentally in­
duced to feel "depressed" recalled 
fewer words from the difficult frames 
than did students in a neutral mood. 
They argued that depressed moods 
reduced the amount of attentional 
resources avai I able for the task at 
hand; sufficient resources were 
available for elaboration on the easy 
trials, but not on the difficult ones. 
Rude and 14 also found impaired 
recall of targets from the difficult tri­
als, but only when the procedures in 
Phase 1 were arranged loosely (as 
they were in the induced-mood ex­
periment) so that subjects were al­
lowed to report the decision when­
ever they chose to do so during each 
8-s trial (the unfocused condition). 
In the focused condition of Phase 1, 
however, the procedure differed in 
two ways: We asked the subjects to 
wait until the end of each trial to 
report their decisions and also to re­
peat the word. Recall of targets from 
both the easy and the difficult frames 
in this focused condition showed no 
evidence of depression-related im­
pairment. The mean percentages of 
words recalled from the difficult 
frames after the unfocused and fo­
cused orienting tasks are shown in 
Figure 1. Depressed subjects were 
clearly capable of such focused at­
tention and needed only some envi­
ronmental support to sustain it. 
(What appears to be a depression­
related advantage in the focused 
condition was not reliable.) In con­
trast, the subjects in the unfocused 
condition of Phase 1 could sustain 
attention on their own initiative or 
could decide quickly and then let 
their minds wander to other mat-
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Fig. 1. Mean percentage of words re­
called from the difficult frames following 
the unfocused or focused orienting task. 
From Hertel and Rude. 4 
ters-perhaps to personal concerns. 
We therefore attributed the de­
pressed subjects' lower recall to im­
paired initiative in sustaining atten­
tion to the task and to the missed 
opportunities for distinctive elabora­
tions that would aid recall.6 
Impaired initiative to attend was 
also the focus of an experiment that 
included an indirect test of mem­
ory-identification of briefly flashed 
words. Such words are identified 
more easily if they have been pre­
sented during an earlier phase than if 
they are new words in the experi­
ment. Compared with direct tests 
like free recall, word identification 
seems to be affected I ittle by elabo­
ration during initial exposure to the 
materials; all that matters is that the 
words are processed as lexical units, 
rather than being viewed as collec­
tions of isolated letters. 7 With these 
findings in mind, I recruited clini­
cally depressed outpatients and non­
depressed control subjects to partic­
ipate in an experiment with three 
phases. 8 
In the first phase, the subjects per­
formed two rating tasks on separate 
lists of words. Words on one list 
were rated for their emotionality; 
words on the other list were rated on 
purely perceptual features (the de­
gree of angularity or curvature in the 
displayed word). The third phase of 
the experiment was a direct test of 
free recall of the rated words. Perfor­
mance on that test was as expected: 
The words that had been processed 
meaningfully were recalled more 
frequently than the others, and the 
depressed subjects recalled fewer 
words from both tasks. All of this 
was old news, but a more interesting 
outcome was obtained in Phase 2. 
Nested between the rating tasks 
and the recall test was an indirect 
test of word identification. The rated 
words and an equal number of new 
words were each flashed briefly; the 
task was to read each word aloud. 
The effect of prior exposure (per­
centage of rated words identified mi­
nus percentage of new words iden­
tified) is shown in Figure 2. The 
percentage of new words identified 
did not differ reliably across condi­
tions. 
As is found typically, nonde­
pressed subjects showed similar ef­
fects of prior exposure across the 
two rating conditions. Further, the 
effect of prior exposure in the con­
ceptual task (emotion ratings) did 
not differ reliably according to 
mood. Words that were rated for 
their perceptual features, in contrast, 
showed a reduced effect of prior ex­
posure in the depressed sample. Al­
though the subjects were not re-
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Fig. 2. Mean effect of prior perceptual or 
conceptual ratings on word identifica­
tion (percentage of old words identified 
in each condition minus percentage of 
new words identified). From Hertel.8 
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quired to approach those materials 
as lexical units during the rating 
task, apparently the nondepressed 
subjects did what most of us would 
expect and attended to the materials 
as words, whereas the depressed 
subjects showed less initiative in this 
most basic respect. This assumed 
lack of attention to words qua words 
in Phase 1 meant that the depressed 
subjects could not read the words as 
effectively on the later identification 
test. To the extent that the mind of 
the depressed person is "else­
where," depression-related impair­
ments can be revealed, even on an 
indirect test. Capturing attention 
with a request to rate emotional 
value, however, ensured the typical 
effect of prior exposure. These find­
ings are difficult to explain by refer­
ence to capacity alone; reading 
words in the perceptual rating task 
requires few resources. 
MONITORING THE 
RELEVANCE OF THE PAST 
Direct tests of memory obviously 
require subjects to focus their atten­
tion on the past; its relevance is 
made explicit. Indirect tests are de­
signed to avoid conscious recollec­
tion of the past, and if that objective 
is achieved, performance on indirect 
tests should not be subject to varia­
tions in initiative to reflect back. In­
deed, with the exception of the ex­
periment just described, depressed 
and nondepressed subjects have 
shown similar effects of prior expo­
sure on several indirect tests. 9 ja­
coby and his colleagues, however, 
have argued recently that tests of 
memory are rarely, if ever, pure 
measures of either controlled reflec­
tion on past events or their nonre­
flective effects; no test is entirely a 
"direct" or "indirect" measure of 
memory.1° For example, consider 
how tests of recognition memory 
can tap both conscious recollection 
and feelings of familiarity. Recogni-
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tion, moreover, sometimes reveals 
depression-related impairments and 
sometimes does not, perhaps as a 
function of the degree to which the 
judgments are recollective or famil­
iarity-based. The initiative to moni­
tor the relevance of the past context, 
rather than to rely primarily on a 
sense of familiarity, should be corre­
lated with depression. This was the 
issue investigated in the following 
experiment, 11 which was modeled 
on jacoby's process-dissociation 
paradigm. 
College students in naturally de­
pressed or nondepressed moods 
were first exposed to a list of word 
pairs. Each pair was presented 
briefly on a computer monitor, and 
the subjects judged the relatedness 
of the two words (although all pairs 
were unrelated by typical stan­
dards). Next, the subjects listened to 
another I ist of words and tried to re­
member them. The final phase of the 
experiment was a recognition test for 
which there were two different sets 
of instructions. Half of the target 
words (first members of pairs) from 
Phase 1, half of the heard words, 
and an equal number of new words 
were evaluated under standard rec­
ognition instructions: Subjects 
judged whether each word had oc­
curred in any earlier phase of the ex­
periment or was new. These judg­
ments could be based on feelings of 
familiarity, on recollection of prior 
context (such as the second mem­
bers of the pairs), or more likely on a 
mixture of both processes. As is of­
ten the case, performance on this 
test failed to show a depression­
related impairment in the number of 
targets endorsed as old. The ques­
tion, however, was whether subjects 
relied on familiarity to make those 
judgments, and whether the two 
groups of subjects would differ in 
their ability to make more controlled 
recollective judgments if required. 
To answer this question, subjects 
were given a second set of instruc­
tions for the remaining items on the 
recognition test. 
Under these instructions, subjects 
were asked to reserve the judgment 
of "old" for words from the second 
(auditory) phase of the experiment 
and to call all words from the first 
phase "new, " along with the truly 
new words. If targets from Phase 1 
were judged erroneously to be old, 
they must have seemed familiar but 
not been recollected as having oc­
curred in that phase; otherwise, ac­
curate reflection on prior context 
would have produced the judgment 
of "new." According to procedures 
established by jacoby, Milan and I 
submitted the percentage of targets 
that were judged old under each set 
of instructions to a set of equations 
for deriving estimates of each com­
ponent of recognition memory­
familiarity and recollection-for 
each subject. Familiarity estimates 
were quite similar across the two 
mood conditions. The estimates for 
recollection, however, were reliably 
lower for the depressed subjects. 
This impairment in the recollec­
tive component of recognition (or in 
source monitoring) might well have 
been caused by the inability to allo­
cate sufficient resources during the 
original exposure to the targets or 
during the recognition test. But 
rather than assuming that the de­
pressed students were incapable in 
either phase, we sought means for 
establishing better cognitive control. 
In a separate set of conditions, we 
reinstated the second members of 
the pairs from Phase 1 as contexts for 
targets on the recognition test and 
told the subjects that they might find 
these second words useful. (We ex­
plained that these paired words ob­
viously were new words when the 
targets were not from Phase 1.) This 
procedure, however, served only to 
increase both components of recog­
nition-familiarity and recollec­
tion-for depressed and nonde­
pressed subjects alike. 
Figure 3 shows the mean esti­
mates of each component of recog­
nition memory, collapsed across the 
single-item and paired-item tests. 
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Fig. 3. Mean estimates of recollection 
and familiarity, collapsed across single­
item and paired-item tests. From Hertel 
and Milan. 11 
These findings are compatible with a 
capacity framework. Within the cog­
nitive-initiative framework, instead 
of assuming inflexible allocation of 
resources, we seek means for train­
ing controlled recollective strate­
gies. Although the provision of con­
text in this experiment did not help 
the depressed subjects more than the 
nondepressed, some previous re­
search I conducted with Hardin pro­
vides a more successful example of 
these efforts. 3 
Again, college students in natu­
rally depressed or nondepressed 
moods performed three tasks. All 
materials and the subjects' responses 
were spoken. First, we asked the 
subjects questions such as "What 
are the days of the week?" As shown 
in this example, some of the ques­
tions contained a homophone-a 
word that sounds the same as an­
other word but has a different mean­
ing and spelling, as week is a hom­
ophone of weak. The second task 
was a rapidly paced spelling test; 
some of the words were homo­
phones, and some of the homo­
phones were taken from the ques­
tion phase. (This test served as an 
indirect measure of memory and 
failed to reveal depression-related 
differences.) The final task was a rec­
ognition test for words from the 
question phase. The nondepressed 
subjects recognized the homo­
phones more accurately than did the 
depressed subjects (as measured by 
d', a statistic from signal detection 
theory). Moreover, the decisions 
made by nondepressed subjects (but 
not depressed subjects) depended 
on how they had spelled those ho­
mophones in the second phase. For 
example, if they had used the spell­
ing "week" instead of the more fre­
quent spelling "weak," they were 
more likely to recognize that word 
as having been used during the 
question phase. We therefore in­
ferred that the nondepressed sub­
jects had devised a strategy for rec­
ognition as exemplified by this series 
of questions: "Was the word on the 
spelling test? How did I spell it? Was 
that word part of one of the ques­
tions I had been asked earlier?" We 
then used these questions as the ba­
sis for new instructions for the rec­
ognition test. That is, we asked other 
subjects to take the recognition test 
by answering each of these ques­
tions for each item. On this guided 
test, the depressed subjects' recogni­
tion of Phase 1 homophones im­
proved to "normal" levels and also 
depended on how the subjects had 
spelled the words. In short, the im­
pairment was eliminated by the pro­
vision of a strategy for monitoring 
the relevance of the past. Figure 4 
presents the mean percentage of ho­
mophones from the question phase 
that were judged to be old under un­
guided versus guided instructions. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR 
REMEDIATION 
In summary, this research ac­
knowledges that the deployment of 
attentional resources is critical to 
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From Hertel and Hardin. 3 
performance on cognitive tasks and 
that deployment is a central problem 
in depression. In contrast to propo­
nents of other approaches, however, 
I believe that a fuller understanding 
of cognition during depression can 
be achieved first by identifying the 
controlled procedures employed by 
nondepressed people on their own 
initiative and then by structuring 
tasks to require the use of those pro­
cedures by all subjects, regardless of 
mood. Only through the experimen­
tal control of attention can research­
ers understand the consequences of 
the lack of self-initiated control and 
learn to structure real-world tasks in 
ways that avoid impaired perfor­
mance. Because feelings of incom­
petence can maintain depressed 
moods, finding means of producing 
competence should help in improv­
ing mood. 
On a happier note, it is worth re­
alizing that impaired attentional 
control is probably inconsequential 
in many everyday uses of memory. 
Past experience often informs cur-
Copyright © 1994 American Psychological Society 
rent experience in nonreflective 
ways, and depressed people seem to 
profit from automatic influences of 
the past as well as happier folks do. 
Understandably, depressed people's 
complaints about memory are based 
on instances of reflection, rather 
than on the more frequent occasions 
of nonreflective use. 
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